Disproportionate damage doctrine in Spain by Navarro Llima Abogados

When the Harm Speaks for Itself: The Disproportionate Damage Doctrine in Spanish Public Healthcare

The doctrine of disproportionate damage only makes sense if it serves a purpose: to compel the public healthcare authorities to explain what would otherwise remain unexplained. That is the thesis we shall defend in this article, and it finds particularly lucid support today in the judgment of the High Court of Justice of Andalusia (Spain), Administrative Chamber, Section 4, of 13 December 2023 (appeal no. 456/2020, ECLI:ES:TSJAND:2023:12820).

Few constructs in the law of medical liability have generated so much literature and, at the same time, so much uncertainty in their application. Between those who reduce it to a boilerplate clause, invoked in almost every claim and upheld in almost none, and those who seek to turn it into a covert system of strict liability, there is a middle ground that should be precisely defined. That is the subject of today’s article, which does not aim to be a neutral account, but rather a reasoned statement of position.

1. The starting point: strict liability tempered by the lex artis

Under Spanish law, the liability of the Public Administration (State liability) is rooted in Article 106.2 of the Spanish Constitution and is currently governed by Articles 32 et seq. of Act 40/2015 of 1 October on the Legal Regime of the Public Sector. Its statutory formulation is strict: all that is required is actual, quantifiable and individualised damage, causally linked to the operation of the public service, which the individual is under no legal duty to bear.

In the healthcare sphere, however, that strictness is heavily qualified. Medicine is an obligation of means, not of result, and the public health service cannot set itself up as the ‘universal insurer’ of recovery. Article 34.1 of Act 40/2015 itself excludes compensation for damage arising from events that could not have been foreseen or avoided according to the state of scientific or technical knowledge. Spanish case law has therefore established the lex artis ad hoc (the accepted standards of medical practice in the specific case) as the criterion that determines whether the damage is unlawful: if the care provided complied with it, the adverse outcome, however painful, is deemed a risk that the patient must bear.

The judgment of the High Court of Justice of Andalusia of 13 December 2023 systematises this doctrine in ten defining features (Legal Ground 7) and acknowledges, with unusual candour, that the link to the lex artis ‘brings the system of healthcare liability closer to the notion of fault’ (Legal Ground 11). It is not, the court explains, a fault comparable to criminal fault, but an ‘objectified fault’, measured against standards, protocols and clinical guidelines.

The burden of proof and information asymmetry

This is the real underlying problem. If healthcare liability requires proof of a departure from the lex artis, and the burden of proving that departure falls, under Article 217 of the Spanish Civil Procedure Act (LEC), on the claimant, the patient is left in a position of manifest information asymmetry. It is the Administration that controls the medical records, the logs, the protocols and the technical knowledge. Article 217.7 LEC, by requiring the court to take into account the availability of evidence to, and the ease of proof for, each party, opens the door to correcting that asymmetry. The doctrine of disproportionate damage is precisely the most complete expression of that correction.

2. Res ipsa loquitur: when the outcome is inconsistent with the absence of fault

The doctrine of disproportionate damage has its roots in the common law rule of res ipsa loquitur, which is close to the French faute virtuelle and the German Anscheinsbeweis (prima facie evidence). Macías Castillo (2006) notes that its literal translation, ‘the thing speaks for itself’, is somewhat loose: its true legal meaning lies in identifying cases in which the harmful outcome and the facts that caused it ‘do not easily withstand an absence of liability’. The outcome is so anomalous that it allows negligence to be presumed, without prejudice to the defendant proving otherwise.

On this basis, Spanish legal scholars have put forward formulations of varying stringency:

  • Munar Bernat (2004) requires a harmful event of a kind that does not ordinarily occur without negligent conduct, arising from conduct within the defendant’s sphere of action (even if its exact details are unknown) and not attributable to the victim’s own sphere. As Vicandi Martínez (2015) points out, it follows from this approach that mere ignorance of the cause would be enough to trigger the doctrine.
  • O’Callaghan Muñoz (2001) places the emphasis on the lack of explanation: if treatment produces damage out of all proportion to the condition that prompted the consultation and the doctor does not explain its cause, that disproportionate outcome ‘establishes the causal link’ between the medical act and the damage.
  • Sánchez García (2013) restricts it to outcomes that are strange and unforeseeable according to experience and common sense, irrespective of their severity, and rules it out where a known risk of the procedure materialises.

Case-law requirements for disproportionate damage

The Spanish administrative courts have distilled these approaches into a relatively stable set of requirements. The judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court (Third Chamber) of 19 May 2016 (appeal no. 2822/2014) describes the ‘glaring outcome’ as an unacceptable, unexpected and unexplained harmful effect, which gives rise to a presumption of breach of the lex artis and shifts to the Administration, on the principle of ease of and proximity to evidence, the burden of proving the circumstances in which the damage occurred. The judgment of the High Court of Justice of Andalusia of 13 December 2023 (Legal Ground 8) sets this out in four cumulative requirements:

  • An unexpected outcome, abnormally serious and disproportionate to the initial risk of the medical procedure.
  • The impossibility of classifying that outcome among the typical risks of the procedure in question.
  • A causal link between the damage and the medical act.
  • The absence of a sufficient, logical and reasonable explanation from the Administration.

Once the claimant has proved the damage and its disproportion, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that it acted diligently or that the damage was due to a cause beyond its control. It should be stressed that this is a rebuttable presumption (iuris tantum), not an absolute reversal of the burden of proof.

3. Judgment of the High Court of Justice of Andalusia (Seville), Administrative Chamber, Section 4, of 13 December 2023 (appeal no. 456/2020)

The facts date back to 2006. A baby is born in a public hospital in Córdoba by forceps-assisted delivery, indicated because of foetal bradycardia during the second stage of labour. The initial assessments are reassuring (Apgar 7/9/10, pH 7.20), but a few hours later bleeding from the nose and ears appears. A CT scan reveals a massive intracranial haemorrhage leading to multicystic encephalopathy: the child is left blind, quadriplegic and with a recognised disability of 85%.

The procedural history illustrates the evidential difficulties that families face. The criminal proceedings ended in dismissal, upheld by the Provincial Court of Córdoba (order of 11 July 2014), which expressly refused to apply the doctrine of disproportionate damage as incompatible with the presumption of innocence. In the administrative courts, Administrative Court No. 5 of Córdoba dismissed the claim (judgment of 13 December 2019): no breach of the lex artis had been proved and, although the cause of the damage remained unknown, ‘the fatal outcome is not enough’ to impose liability.

The High Court’s decision

The High Court of Justice of Andalusia overturns that judgment. It confirms that there is no evidence of malpractice either before the birth or in the subsequent neonatal care, but finds that the first-instance judge failed to consider the disproportionate damage perspective in relation to the use of forceps. Its reasoning rests on several elements:

  • The experts instructed by the co-defendant insurer themselves described the severity of the haemorrhage as ‘striking’, acknowledged that its most common cause is obstetric trauma and admitted that they could not determine its origin.
  • With the prenatal and neonatal stages ruled out for lack of evidence, the damage ‘must necessarily have occurred’ during delivery (Legal Ground 12).
  • A paediatric neurologist identified on the CT scan signs consistent with a parietal fracture coinciding with the haematoma, and a neurosurgeon attributed the haemorrhage to the forceps.
  • Against that explanation, the alternatives put forward by the defendants amounted to no more than ‘conjectures’ advanced without conviction.

The court rightly distinguishes between the indication for forceps, which was correct, and their proper use, which the Administration failed to prove. Faced with ‘such catastrophic and abnormal results’, it is not enough to assert that these things can happen. The ruling orders the Andalusian Health Service (SAS) and its insurer, jointly and severally, to pay €150,000 to each parent and a lifetime annuity of €3,000 per month to the child, subject to a cap of €1,500,000.

4. Assessment of the doctrine of disproportionate damage

Having set out the framework and the requirements, and examined the judgment above, we now turn to an assessment of the doctrine of disproportionate damage:

a. Excluded typical risks

Sánchez García (2013), when examining the typical risks excluded from the doctrine, attaches ‘particular importance’ to brain damage suffered by newborns during delivery. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court’s Third Chamber of 17 December 2012 (appeal no. 6693/2010), the author argues that such damage unfortunately falls within the possible scenarios that medical science has not managed to eliminate, so that it cannot be classed as disproportionate damage.

We disagree with that reading, at least insofar as it is formulated as a general rule. It should be borne in mind that the study dates from 2013 and that subsequent case law has significantly refined the issue. The High Court of Justice of Andalusia puts it precisely (Legal Ground 13): that Supreme Court judgment ruled ‘in the present case’, tied to its facts and constrained by the strict limits on reviewing evidence in cassation. It contains no dogmatic statement of general application. To conclude that neurological damage to a newborn is always a typical risk would be as rigid as asserting that it must always be compensated.

The correct reasoning, in our view, does not ask whether brain damage is possible in the abstract during childbirth, because almost anything is. It asks whether the actual extent of the damage is consistent with the course of care that the Administration claims to have followed. A delivery that, according to the defendants, proceeded normally and in line with protocol should not end in a haemorrhage of ‘extraordinary dimensions’. When that happens, the disproportion lies not in the type of complication but in its intensity, and that asymmetry calls for an explanation.

The function of the doctrine according to the High Court

We therefore fully endorse the central passage of the High Court’s judgment (Legal Ground 8), which is, in our opinion, the best summary of the function of this doctrine:

‘If this doctrine of disproportionate damage is to have any real practical effect (…), it must be accepted that such effect lies in the fact that, by shifting the burden of proof, it may make it possible to require the defendant healthcare authority to explain convincingly how it can be that, even though the established guidelines and protocols were apparently followed, a harmful outcome so abnormal or unusual and so quantitatively and qualitatively significant nevertheless ensued (…); so that, in the absence of such an explanation, liability may be found.’

The key lies in the word ‘apparently’. The doctrine does not operate against care that was genuinely correct, but against merely apparent correctness, belied by the eloquence of the outcome. If the patient were required to prove a breach of the lex artis beforehand, the doctrine would be pointless: it would be reduced, in the court’s own words, to ‘an academic digression of a speculative nature’.

b. The defendant’s sphere of control and reasonable doubt

The most delicate point of the doctrine is determining how much certainty about the origin of the damage the claimant must provide. Here Munar Bernat’s (2004) thesis needs to be qualified. If mere ignorance of the cause were enough to trigger the presumption, the doctrine would become pure strict liability, incompatible with the nature of healthcare as an obligation of means.

But the opposite extreme is equally unacceptable. Requiring the patient to prove with certainty that the cause lies within the sphere of medical care amounts to demanding precisely what the doctrine seeks to spare them: proof of what only the Administration can know.

Our position lies between these two extremes. The doctrine of disproportionate damage should apply where it has not been established, beyond doubt, that the damage originated outside the defendant’s sphere of action; in other words, where there are reasonable and well-founded doubts that the cause lies within that sphere. General ignorance of the cause is not enough. That ignorance must relate to an area that the Administration controls and which, therefore, it is in a position to clarify.

How the High Court applied it to the case

That is exactly what the High Court of Justice of Andalusia does:

  • It rules out, for lack of evidence, that the damage originated before the birth or during the subsequent neonatal care.
  • It locates the origin of the damage, ‘purely by exclusion’, in the delivery, that is, at the very core of the medical care.
  • It identifies, on the basis of the expert evidence, ‘solid and well-founded doubts’ as to the proper use of the forceps.
  • It finds that the Administration, which bore the burden of dispelling them, failed to do so.

The exact cause remained unknown with scientific certainty; the forensic doctor even doubted that it would ever be known. But the uncertainty was no longer general: it was confined to the healthcare sphere. In that scenario, the lack of an explanation cannot prejudice those who had no access to what happened.

This reading ties in with O’Callaghan Muñoz’s (2001) formulation: what matters is not that the patient identifies the cause, but that the practitioner fails to explain it. With one qualification we consider essential: the absence of an explanation only acquires evidential value when the doubt as to the origin of the damage reasonably points to the care provided. Understood in this way, the doctrine does not presume fault in a vacuum, but allocates the risk of uncertainty according to the ease of proof principle in Article 217.7 LEC.

5. Prudence, autonomy and a healthy incentive

Advocating an effective application of the doctrine does not mean advocating its indiscriminate application. The judgment itself insists that it does not operate as a universal insurance clause against unsatisfactory outcomes. It must be applied with prudence, on well-founded data and with reasoning confined to the circumstances of the case. Three consequences of this approach deserve emphasis:

  • First: dismissal of the criminal proceedings does not close the door. The court firmly rejects the idea that a criminal acquittal or the closure of the proceedings prevents State liability from being found later. Criminal liability is governed by the principle of culpability and the presumption of innocence, which preclude shifting the burden of proof to the suspect. State liability is not punitive in nature and does allow that shift. There is no contradiction in the doctors not having committed an offence and, at the same time, the Administration having failed to demonstrate good practice.
  • Second: the burden is no heavier for the Administration than for the patient. To the objection that the proof required of the health service is difficult, the court replies that it is no more difficult than that ordinarily required of citizens who bring medical negligence claims. We share this view. Shifting the burden does not create a privilege for the patient; it corrects an inequality of arms that exists from the outset.
  • Third: the doctrine encourages good clinical record-keeping. If an unjustified lack of clinical data counts against the Administration, health services have a powerful incentive to record every decision and every manoeuvre rigorously, as already required in respect of medical records by Spain’s Act 41/2002 on patient autonomy. This is not about red tape, but about ensuring that whoever controls the information bears the consequences of failing to produce it.

A practical note for litigators

One final practical point: the High Court of Justice of Andalusia reviews the first-instance court’s assessment of the evidence because it had overlooked the disproportionate damage perspective. For those litigating in this field, the lesson is clear: the doctrine must be invoked from the outset of the claim, expressly and with proper grounds, and supported by expert evidence establishing both the severity of the damage and its disproportion to the typical risk of the procedure.

6. Conclusions

The doctrine of disproportionate damage does not turn the public healthcare authorities into insurers of outcomes, but nor can it be reduced to a rhetorical formula cited only to be dismissed. Its function is more modest and, at the same time, more demanding: when an outcome is so serious and anomalous that it belies the apparent normality of the care provided, and reasonable doubt as to its origin points to the healthcare sphere, it falls to whoever provided the care to explain what happened.

The judgment of the High Court of Justice of Andalusia of 13 December 2023 shows that this construct can be applied rigorously, without automatism and with full respect for the nature of medical care as an obligation of means. Ultimately, it is a matter of basic justice: silence as to the cause of devastating harm cannot be borne by those who never had access to what happened during the procedure.

At Navarro Llima Abogados we advise on State liability claims against the Public Administration in Spain. If you or a family member have suffered harm while receiving care in the Spanish public healthcare system and are unsure whether you can bring a claim, we remain at your disposal for any enquiry at info@navarrollimaabogados.com.

Academic references

    • Macías Castillo, A. (2006): «Res ipsa loquitur y responsabilidad civil del traumatólogo», Diario La Ley, no. 43.
    • Munar Bernat, P. A. (2004): «Daños causados por actos médicos», Práctica de Derecho de Daños, no. 18.
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